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I. INTRODUCTION
A. An Historical Overview
As the American legal system has developed, the courts, attorneys,
and bar associations have worked vigorously to demarcate the practice
of law,' to limit the practice of law to those with the requisite qualifi-
cations, 2 and to penalize the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) by
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REvmw.
1. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences
Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 Am. B. FoUND. RES. J.
159, 181-87, 191-97.
2. See id. at 168-69.
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those who lack the necessary education and training.3 The first legis-
lation restricting the practice of law was enacted in the 1640s and was
meant to regulate the activities of all "attorneys" who had not been
trained as barristers in England, which, practically speaking, applied
to nearly all of the early practitioners.4 The first real campaign
against UPL was launched in the mid-eighteenth century by the mem-
bers of fledgling bar associations 5 "seeking to disassociate [them-
selves] from the untrained practitioners with whom they had
previously shared both the practice of law and the title 'attorney.'..."6
In an attempt to suppress the activities of untrained practitioners, the
bar associations established standards governing an attorney's educa-
tion and training as well as requirements for admission to practice in
the courts. 7
In the century following the Revolutionary War, most of the efforts
to regulate the practice of law were abandoned. The legal profession
experienced a decentralization and deprofessionalization which re-
opened the courts to scores of untrained laymen.8 The pendulum,
however, continued to swing. Around 1870, the bar associations
reemerged with greater organization and influence than ever before
and gradually reestablished control over the admission to law prac-
tice. 9 Although one of their goals was to lessen perceived "overcrowd-
3. See id. at 187.
4. See id. at 163; see also JAMEs WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW
251 (1950). Indeed, these early attorneys had no formal legal training but often
worked in and around the courts in other capacities, usually as baliffs, deputies,
clerks, or justices. See CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 5
(1911); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Consti-
tutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1981). Their interest in other people's litigation appears to have
been derived primarily from the court fees they could collect. See HURST, supra,
at 5. Thus, the first UPL laws sought to prevent the stirring up of litigation, the
charging of excessive fees, and injuries caused by attorneys' incompetence, in-
cluding injury to clients' causes and interference with the courts. See Christen-
sen, supra note 1, at 162-63.
5. Although bar associations appeared on the scene in the mid-1700s, they exper-
ienced a decline in both status and power in the years following the Revolution-
ary War. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 169; see also HURST, supra note 4, at
285-86 (noting that, in the first two generations after the war, most local bar
associations disappeared or became merely social in nature).
6. Christensen, supra note 1, at 166.
7. See id. at 168.
8. See id. at 169-75. Interestingly, one legal historian suggests that the impetus
behind that era's hostility towards lawyers was the fact that "[t]he chief law busi-
ness.., was the collection of debts and the enforcement of contracts; and the jails
were filled to overflowing with men imprisoned for debt under the rigorous laws
of the times." WARREN, supra note 4, at 214.
9. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 175-77; see also HURST, supra note 4, at 276-77.
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ing at the bar,"1 0 competition from within was not the only catalyst for
their efforts.
Beginning in the mid- to late-1800s, competition for "law busi-
ness"1 1 by nonlawyers triggered' 2 what one scholar has called "the
modern unauthorized practice movement."'13 The primary source of
lay competition and, therefore, the primary source of concern, was not
the individual nonlawyer but the business corporation.14 Indeed, "the
business corporation posed a threat to lawyers both because corporate
business tended to develop legal needs that lawyers seemed not yet
able to meet, and because corporations had, or could develop, the ca-
pacity to compete effectively with lawyers in providing traditional
kinds of legal services."' 5 It is no coincidence, then, that the first sig-
nificant wave of legislation and litigation against UPL closely followed
the rise of the corporation.16 While the bar associations were unsuc-
cessful in entirely preventing lay competitors from engaging in law
business, the spread of broadly-drafted UPL legislation ensured that
the activities of nonlawyers would be strictly restrained and
regulated.17
A body of statutory and common law prohibiting UPL developed
during the mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries to pave the
way for the explosion of litigation which occurred from 1920 to 1960.18
Beginning in 1920, bar associations intensified their efforts against
unlicensed practitioners, this time targeting business corporations.
They opposed the corporate "menaces" through the combined strength
of four hundred standing committees on UPL, which were actively in-
10. Christensen, supra note 1, at 177. But see HURST, supra note 4, at 314-19 (citing
a report which suggested that "there was nothing more than opinion to support
the belief that the bar was 'overcrowded").
11. "Law business" included activities such as conducting real estate transactions,
searching titles, collecting debts, creating and overseeing trusts and estates,
drafting of wills, giving tax advice, and adjusting property damage claims. See
HURST, supra note 4, at 319-20; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
825 (1986).
12. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 177; see also HURST, supra note 4, at 319 (noting
that "[c]ompetition from outside the profession began to figure as a material ele-
ment in the economic situation of the bar in the 1880's").
13. Christensen, supra note 1, at 175.
14. See id. at 187. See generally HURST, supra note 4, at 319-20 (identifying busi-
nesses with specialized knowledge as the lay competitors for law business).
15. Christensen, supra note 1, at 178.
16. Scholars disagree about what role, if any, the bar associations played during this
period in either the enactment of legislation against UPL or in the suits brought
against nonlawyers. Compare HURST, supra note 4, at 320-22, with Christensen,
supra note 1, at 179-86.
17. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 180-81.
18. See id. at 189-97.
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volved in local campaigns to encourage attorneys to aid in the unau-
thorized practice battle.19
B. Justifications for Rules Against the Unauthorized
Practice of Law
As the body of law against UPL emerged and evolved, proponents
of the regulations offered four primary justifications for rules against
UPL: protecting clients and the public from harm, preventing harm to
the legal system, providing a framework for regulating attorneys, and
maintaining control over the legal system.2 0
Protecting clients from harm involves two areas of concern. First,
UPL rules are meant to prevent clients from being harmed by the in-
competence of untrained practitioners. One who has not been admit-
ted to practice law is generally regarded as more likely to cause harm
when he attempts to represent another person or to aid him in legal
matters than one who has received formal education and training in
the law.21 The second area of concern is one that many courts cite,
particularly in the context of collection agency activities. Proponents
of UPL rules argue that clients are more likely to suffer harm when
licensed attorneys perform legal services for a business corporation
19. See id. at 189; see also Rhode, supra note 4, at 7-9 (pointing to the Great Depres-
sion as the primary trigger for the intensified efforts). One writer actually cast
the efforts in the discourse of war:
The legal profession finally awakened from its lethargy when the prob-
lem [of UPLI became too acute to be longer ignored. The lawyer became
aware of the fact that he was no longer faced with isolated cases of lay
encroachment, but that his field had been invaded by well organized cor-
porations and lay agencies which, if they were not curbed, would soon
destroy his profession. As a result of this awakening[,] the Bar associa-
tions of practically every state and community have united in an aggres-
sive campaign to stamp out the evil of unauthorized practice of the law.
Russell M. Struthers, Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 15 NEB. LAw BULLE-
TIN 164, 164 (1936)(footnote omitted).
20. See WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 828-34 (calling proponents' desire to maintain
control over the legal system a desire to enhance the economic position of law-
yers); see also Christensen, supra note 1, at 187-89 (identifying the same justifica-
tions but noting that lawyers' self-interest was an unabashed justification until
the early 20th century).
21. See WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 829-30. Wolfram suggests that concerns about
incompetence are overstated. He raises the question of the difference in levels of
competence among attorneys themselves or between a recent law school graduate
conducting his first real estate transaction and an experienced lay real estate
agent with years of experience. He states: "The proposition that the client is bet-
ter off paying the lawyer than the agent is hardly obvious at an intuitive level."
Id. at 829.
Other scholars agree, expressing doubt about the extent of actual injury to the
public. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 33-34 (reporting that, in 1979, out of 1,188
injuries, investigations, and complaints reported by officials of the various bars,
only 2% of the complaints came from clients who had been injured); Christensen,
supra note 1, at 203.
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because the attorney's loyalties are divided between the client and the
corporation, and the corporation controls the attorney's professional
judgment.2 2 For example, numerous courts have found that when an
attorney is retained by a collection agency, the true client is not the
collection agency but the creditor. Consequently, if conflicts of inter-
est arise between the creditor and the collection agency, the attorney's
loyalties will be impermissibly divided between the true client-the
creditor-and the collection agency that pays his fee.23
The attorney-client relationship . . .'cannot exist between an attorney em-
ployed by a corporation to practice law for it, and a client of the corporation
.... There would be neither contract nor privity between him and the client,
and he would not owe even the duty of counsel to the actual litigant.'
2 4
In this kind of situation, the collection agency is regarded as an
intermediary which has placed itself between the attorney and the
creditor and, by that act, has committed two wrongs. First, it "ab-
sorb[s] and destroy[s] the relation of direct personal confidences and
responsibility which ought to exist between attorney and client."25
Second, the collection agency holds itself out as providing legal serv-
ices to the clients and makes a profit on the attorney's services. 2 6
The second main justification for rules against UPL is that they
protect the legal system itself from the incompetence and unregulated
conduct of laymen. "It is thought that nonlawyers, because they are
ignorant of law and unskilled in legal matters, would clog the courts
with unfounded claims and defenses; ... create litigation and confu-
sion with ineffective deeds, wills, and other legal instruments; and
generally throw the legal system into chaos." 27
The third justification for rules against UPL arises out of the de-
sire to protect the legal system. In order to protect the legal system, a
framework for regulating attorney conduct must exist. In most states,
attorneys are required to comply with certain ethical and practical
22. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 188-89; see, e.g., Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634,
641-42 (Utah 1944)(stating that an attorney should hold his client's best interest
over all other considerations except his duty as an officer of the court, but where a
collection agency hires an attorney, his interests are divided between the collec-
tion agency and the creditor, who is his true client); State ex rel. State Bar v.
Bonded Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Wis. 1967)(noting that, where the
collection agency directs the services of a lawyer, the duty and allegiance of the
lawyer is diverted from the true client).
23. See, e.g., Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634, 641-42 (Utah 1944); State ex rel. Frieson
v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641, 653-54 (W. Va. 1981); State ex rel. State Bar v. Bonded
Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Wis. 1967).
24. Christensen, supra note 1, at 189 (quoting In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E.
15, 16 (N.Y. 1910)).
25. Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 189 S.E. 153, 159 (Va. 1937).
26. See J.H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 597 (D.C. 1973);
Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579,583 (Iowa 1944); Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634,
641-42 (Utah 1944).
27. WoLFF-u, supra note 11, at 833.
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rules of conduct, usually established and enforced by the state bar
association or the courts. If nonlawyers have not been admitted to the
bar or admitted to practice in the courts, they are subject neither to
the regulations and restrictions which govern attorney conduct, nor to
discipline by the courts.28 Without UPL rules, then, there is no way
to control nonlawyer conduct because there is no incentive to abide by
the rules governing licensed attorneys.2 9
The final justification for rules against UPL is that these rules pro-
tect the profession from unrestrained competition.3O Of course, this
reason is rarely articulated by either attorneys or the courts, except to
deny that it exists. One court rejected the implication that either the
legal profession or the courts were motivated by self-interest in enforc-
ing UPL rules. In its interpretation of the plaintiffs original petition,
which claimed that the suit was "on behalf of plaintiffs as practicing
attorneys and of others similarly situated,"31 the court found that
[tihe allegation, properly interpreted is proper. It does not mean that the pur-
pose is to protect lawyers from unwanted competition. It refers rather to the
duty, as well as the right, of attorneys to preserve the integrity of their profes-
sion, in the interest not merely of its members but of the public generally,
against assaults from without as well as from unfaithfulness within. The per-
formance of this duty is frequently made especially difficult because the mo-
tives back of such performances are so easily misunderstood or
misrepresented.3 2
History suggests, however, that attorneys' private interests were
openly acknowledged during the emergence of the bars. This forth-
rightness, however, began to disappear around the turn of the cen-
tury.3 3  That these private interests were at work-at least
unconsciously-can be seen in the widespread use of "Statements of
Principles" between the 1920s and the 1960s.34 These statements
were agreements between bar associations and representatives of var-
ious professions (usually those which presented a competitive
threat 3 5), identifying activities which the parties "agreed" constituted
the practice of law.3 6 Courts used these agreements in their opinions
to help them define precedentially the practice of law in a particular
28. See id.
29. But see State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 300, 268 N.W. 95, 98-99
(1936) (holding that the supreme court has the inherent power to use its con-
tempt power to punish any person who practices law without a license).
30. See WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 833-34.
31. Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Iowa 1944).
32. Id.
33. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 187.
34. See id. at 195-96; WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 826.
35. For example, collection agencies, trust companies, insurance companies, real es-
tate brokerages, and title companies all signed Statements of Principles. See
Christensen, supra note 1, at 195-96.
36. See id.; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 826.
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jurisdiction.3 7 Then, in the late 1970s, bar associations began volun-
tarily rescinding their Statements of Principles under the threat of
antitrust charges.3 8
Whether any of these justifications can be taken at face value is
uncertain. One thing is sure: the actual motives behind UPL rules
will always be subject to questioning in light of the fact that the rules
have always been "defined, articulated, promulgated, and enforced...
by the legal profession" even though they have been asserted to be in
the public interest.3 9
During the height of unauthorized practice litigation from 1920 to
1960, a number of state bar associations brought suit against collec-
tion agencies.40 Whether these suits were motivated by anti-competi-
tive fervor, 4 1 by an altruistic desire to protect the public from
unscrupulous collection practices,4 2 15 U.S.C. § 169243 or by a combi-
nation of both will probably never be known. It is clear, however, that
although the bar associations' organized campaigns against UPL have
ended,44 collection agencies continue to face charges that they are en-
37. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 196; see also J.H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc. v.
Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 598 (D.C. 1973) (citing at length the Statement of Princi-
ples applicable to collection agencies in support of its reasoning in the case).
38. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 200; WoLFaI, supra note 11, at 826.
39. Christensen, supra note 1, at 201.
40. See id. at 192-93; see also Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Finance Sys., Inc., 76 N.W.2d
23 (Mich. 1956); Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1944); Nelson v. Smith,
154 P.2d 634 (Utah 1944); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 189
S.E. 153 (Va. 1937); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' Rating & Adjust-
ing Co., 49 P.2d 26 (Wash. 1935).
41. See WOLFRAm, supra note 11, at 825. See generally HURST, supra note 4, at 319-
20 (noting the substantial growth in the business of debt collection).
42. The excesses of some collectors have been well-documented in numerous cases
which have come before the courts. One court characterized their methods as
designed to terrorize the individual... and to present to him as a mon-
ster of retribution the law, the courts ofjustice, and various and sundry
processes, some legal and judicial, and some extrajudicial, and unknown
to the law, and all claimed by [debt collectors] to be subservient to [them]
in carrying out their threats.
Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Iowa 1944); see also Housh v. Peth, 135
N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) (holding that collection agent was liable for inva-
sion of right of privacy where he deliberately and maliciously harassed a teacher
by calling her numerous times every day for three weeks, sometimes late at
night, by calling her superiors and informing them of the debt, and by calling the
teacher away from her classroom three times within fifteen minutes). The abuses
of some debt collectors and collection agencies during this century, particularly in
the years following the Great Depression, ultimately led to the Congressional en-
actment of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
43. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in 1977. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994).
44. The bars' campaigns against UPL came to an end under the threat of antitrust
suits by the Justice Department for "conspiracy to monopolize and restrain
trade." WoLFRA1, supra note 11, at 827 & n.22.
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gaged in UPL, particularly when their collection efforts include suing
on assigned debts.
Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier4 5 confronted the question of
whether a collection agency which sues on assigned debts in its own
name is engaged in UPL. In answering this question, the court em-
ployed a traditional method of analysis, which this Note will discuss
at length. Not surprisingly, the Poirier court reached the equally
traditional conclusion that, because the collection agency was not the
real party in interest, it was representing the interests of another in
court and was thereby engaged in UPL.46
This Note first discusses the facts of Poirier and identifies and ex-
plores the traditional theories used to analyze the issues in UPL cases
involving collection agencies. Next, the Note analyzes the functional
approach used in non-UPL cases involving collection agencies and
their creditor-clients, explaining why this method is preferable to the
traditional UPL theories and why it should be applied in noncreditor
cases. The Note then analogizes the relationship between a collection
agency and creditor to the relationship between a trustee and the ben-
eficiary of a trust. Finally, this Note explores the current state of UPL
law in Nebraska as it applies to collection agencies and recommends
that the Nebraska Supreme Court employ the functional approach
when called on to decide this issue.
II. BACKGROUND
Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier (Poirier 1)47 began as an action
brought by a licensed collection agency (Alco) and its president (Allen)
to recover a debt allegedly owed by Poirier to her former landlord (Sa-
voy Apartments). The federal companion case was Poirier v. Alco Col-
lections, Inc., (Poirier II),48 in which Poirier sued Alco and Allen
pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).49 Only
one section, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), is relevant to this discussion.50 The
decision in Poirier 1151 relied upon the court's holding in Poirier 152
that Alco and Allen were engaged in UPL.
45. 680 So. 2d 735 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
46. See id. at 744.
47. 680 So. 2d 735 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
48. 107 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1997).
49. Poirier alleged that Alco had violated two sections of the FDCPA.
50. Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using "any false, deceptive, or mis-
leading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt."
15 U.S.C. § 1692e (1994). Poirier claimed that Alco violated § 1692e(5) when it
"threat[ened] to take any action that cannot legally be taken." Id. at § 1692e(5).
If a debt collector fails to comply with any provision of the FDCPA, it is liable to
the affected person for civil damages. See id. at § 1692k(a).
51. 107 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1997).
52. 680 So. 2d 735, 744 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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In 1993, Poirier allegedly defaulted on her lease, owing Savoy
Apartments three months back rent and late fees. 53 Savoy Apart-
ments assigned Poirier's debt to Alco on February 8, 1994.54 Nine
days later, Alco, which was represented only by Allen and not by an
attorney, filed suit in the small claims division 5 5 of the Baton Rouge
City Court.56 Poirier answered, alleging, inter alia, that the assign-
ment to Alco was invalid and that Alco's suit on the assigned claim
constituted UPL under Louisiana law.5 7 Poirier also requested a
transfer from the small claims division to the regular city court
docket.58 Upon transfer, Alco retained a licensed attorney to repre-
sent it in the action.59
Following discovery, Poirier filed a peremptory exception of no
cause of action. 6O She argued that, because the assignment author-
ized Alco to take action which constituted UPL, it was null; therefore,
Alco lacked the interest necessary to enforce its claim.6 1 On Novem-
ber 21, 1995, the trial judge denied Poirier's exception, and Poirier
appealed the decision to the Louisiana Appellate Court. The question
on appeal was whether the trial court erred in allowing a collection
agency to sue in its own name on debts assigned to it on a contingency
fee basis.62
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision to allow the
suit, holding that a collection agency that sues on an assigned debt in
53. See id. at 737.
54. See id. The court cited the relevant portion of the assignment as follows:
SAVOY PLAZA APARTMENTS, (hereinafter "Client"), hereby assigns
unto Alco Collections, Inc. (hereinafter "Alco"), the following debt, pres-
ently owed to Client: DIXIE V. POIRER #264 [sic].
As consideration for the above assignment, ALCO hereby agrees to
make a good faith effort to collect this debt, including the filing of suit in
the appropriate court of law in order to enforce that debt, and remit to
client 50.00% of all sums collected through suit or otherwise on said
debt.
Id. at 737-38.
55. Louisiana state law allows plaintiffs to bring actions pro se in its small claims
division. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:5200 (West 1942).
56. See Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier, 680 So. 2d 735, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
57. See LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 37:212 A and C (West 1942).
58. See Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier, 680 So. 2d 735, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
59. See id.
60. See LA. CODE Crv. PRoc. ANN. art. 927(5) (West 1984). This procedure "tests
whether the plaintiff has any interest in judicially enforcing the right asserted."
Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier, 680 So. 2d 735, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
61. See Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier, 680 So. 2d 735, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
62. See id. The court in Poirier I did not reach the question of whether Alco's actions
would have been legal if it had been represented by an attorney from the outset.
The court did not reach this question presumably because Alco was not repre-
sented by counsel when the action was first brought or when Poirier answered,
alleging the UPL violation. Alco retained an attorney only after Poirier success-
fully removed the action from the small claims division to the regular docket of
the Baton Rouge City Court.
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its own name is engaged in UPL.63 The court based its holding upon
the effect of the assignment from Savoy Apartments to Alco.64 This
assignment theory centers upon an analysis of who constitutes the
real party in interest in the suit: the collection agency or the creditor.
A number of other jurisdictions which have addressed UPL issues
have also used the assignment theory as the primary vehicle for their
reasoning. The results in these cases demonstrate a clear split of
opinion. Some courts hold that the collection agency is the real party
in interest and may therefore sue in its own name on the assignment;
others hold that, although the collection agency is the real party in
interest, the assignment is merely a subterfuge for an illegal pur-
pose 6 5 and is therefore void.
A. The Assignment Theory in UPL Cases
Those courts upholding a collection agency's right to sue in its own
name generally rely upon either case law or a state statute that autho-
rizes an assignee to maintain a suit in its own name as the real party
in interest.66 In Cohn v. Thompson,67 the defendant debtor claimed
that, although the collection agency had employed an attorney, it was
nonetheless engaged in UPL. The defendant claimed that the collec-
tion agency was not the real party in interest because it had not
purchased the claims; therefore, when it sued in its own name, it was
actually representing someone else's interests, which it could not do
because it was not a licensed attorney.68 The defendant also claimed
that the collection agency was trying to sell legal services for profit.6 9
63. See id. at 744. The court did not reach the question of whether the presence of a
licensed attorney would have cured the UPL defect. Its particular holding, how-
ever, suggests that attorney representation would have made no difference: Alco
simply did not have the right to bring suit in its own name. See id. at 745. A
defect of party is not likely to be cured by the addition of an attorney.
64. See id. at 739-41.
65. The illegal purpose is authorizing a person or entity not licensed as an attorney to
represent the interests of the creditor in court. Although most of these courts do
not state this proposition directly, it is implied in their reasoning and their con-
clusions. Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634, 639-40 (Utah 1944), is one of the few
courts to spell out the argument.
66. See Cruz v. Lusk Collection Agency, 580 P.2d 1210, 1212-13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978);
Smith v. Nat'l Cashflow Sys., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Ark. 1992); LeDoux v.
Credit Research Corp., 125 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Cohn v.
Thompson, 16 P.2d 364, 365 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1932); Thibodeaux v.
Creditors Servs., Inc., 551 P.2d 714, 715-16 (Colo. 1976); Washington State Bar
Ass'n v. Merchants' Rating & Adjusting Co., 49 P.2d 26, 28 (Wash. 1935);
DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
67. 16 P.2d 364 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1932).
68. See id. at 365.
69. See id. The selling of legal services has been held in other cases to be a violation
of the rules against UPL. See Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634, 639-40 (Utah 1944).
Reading between the lines in Cohn suggests that the same would be true in Cali-
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The court's first step in analyzing the issue was to cite the general
rule provided in California's real party in interest statute: "[W]hoever
holds the legal title to a demand is the real party in interest, and may
sue thereon in his own name."7 0 The court then observed that the
effect of the assignment is to vest legal title in the assignee, and that
legal title is "sufficient to enable [the assignee] to recover, although
the assignor retains an equitable interest in the thing assigned."7 '
Next, the court turned to the collection agreement 7 2 between the cred-
itor and collection agency. Based upon its interpretation, the court
found that the collection agency had not agreed to furnish legal serv-
ices to the creditor but had
merely agree[d] to do that which [it] can legally do without any agreement, by
virtue of the assignment. Provided the assignment is absolute, so as to vest
the apparent legal title in the assignee, the latter is entitled to sue in [its] own
name, whatever collateral arrangements have been made between [it] and the
assignor respecting the proceeds.
7 3
Under the analysis of the Cohn court, the inquiry ends once it is
found that the assignment vests legal title in the assignee. 74 From
that point, the result follows logically: when the collection agency
holds legal title, it is the real party in interest. 75 Therefore, it may
hire an attorney to represent its interests in court, and it may main-
tain an action in its own name because it is acting to enforce its own
interest and not the interest of another. Thus, the collection agency is
not engaged in UPL.76
fornia. See Cohn v. Thompson, 16 P.2d 364, 365 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1932)(being careful to explain that the collection agency was not furnishing legal
services, nor had it agreed to).
70. Cohn v. Thompson, 16 P.2d 364, 365 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1932).
71. Id.
72. The court cited the relevant portions of the agreement as found by the trial court:
[I]t was contracted and agreed by and between the said plaintiff, [an in-
dividual doing business as the California Claim Service], and the [credi-
tor], in consideration of said assignment, that the plaintiff would
endeavor to collect the account described in the complaint from the de-
fendant at plaintiffs expense, if possible. . . , but in the event that the
said account could not be collected from the defendant without suit, then
in that event, plaintiff would sue in his (plaintiffs) own name, and hire
an attorney at his own expense to bring said suit and prosecute same to
judgment, and if successful, and a collection was made, plaintiff was to
deduct the costs and a certain percentage of the account collected from
the amount collected for his services, and then remit the balance due to
plaintiffs assignors ....
Id. at 364.
73. Id. at 365. The Cohn court noted specifically that, where an assignment is made
for the purpose of collection, it is not necessary that the assignee pay any consid-
eration in order for the legal title to vest in the assignee. See id.
74. See id. at 365-66.
75. See id. at 365.
76. Other jurisdictions have followed the Cohn analysis. See Cruz v. Lusk Collection
Agency, 580 P.2d 1210, 1212-13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Smith v. National Cashflow
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The Poirier I court analyzed the assignment differently. Its ap-
proach is fairly uncommon even among other jurisdictions finding
against collection agencies. The difference arises from common and
statutory law unique to the particular jurisdiction. In Louisiana, an
assignment is a type of sale which requires a fixed price to be valid.7 7
The assignment from Savoy Apartments to Alco did not recite a fixed
monetary consideration; instead, the court noted, "it appears that the
payment of consideration was contingent upon the success of Alco's
collection efforts."78 Without a valid sale, the assignment was insuffi-
cient to transfer the complete ownership necessary to make Alco the
real party in interest.7 9 Consequently, when Alco sued in its own
name on the assigned debt, it acted in a representative capacity to
enforce the interests of the creditor, an act which the court character-
ized as providing legal services.8 0 Since Alco was not a licensed attor-
ney, the court held that it was engaged in UPL.8
A similar approach was used in Bump v. Barnett.8 2 The court held
that where one makes a business of collecting and suing on assigned
claims, the claims must be purchased in order for the assignment to
transfer ownership to the assignee.8 3 Then, the assignee can be re-
garded as litigating his own case in court.8 4 Where the claims are not
purchased, however, the assignee is not "dealing in property on his
own account, . . . [rather], he is selling [legal] service and merely
adopting the guise of an investor to conceal the real nature of his oper-
ations."8 5 The court then distinguished the "business" of suing on
claims for the purpose of collection8 6 from the general right of an as-
Sys., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Ark. 1992); LeDoux v. Credit Research Corp.,
125 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Thibodeaux v. Creditors Serv.,
Inc., 551 P.2d 714, 715-16 (Colo. 1976); Washington State Bar Ass'n v.
Merchants' Rating & Adjusting Co., 49 P.2d 26, 28 (Wash. 1935); DeBenedictis v.
Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); cf Messmer v. Carter, 578 P.2d
788, 789 (Or. 1978)(implying a real party in interest analysis by upholding a col-
lection agency statute which provided that "[a] collection agency shall have a
property right in any account assigned to it for billing and collection").
77. See Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier, 680 So. 2d 735, 739 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
78. Id. at 741.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 743.
81. See id. at 744; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:212 A (defining the practice of
law) and 37:213 (prohibiting the practice of law by corporations and unlicensed
natural persons) (West 1984).
82. 16 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1944). Citations to Barnett appear frequently in decisions
holding against collection agencies, even though most of them do not actually
follow the approach used in the case.
83. See id. at 582.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 583 for a discussion of what constitutes a "business." In addition, the
fact that the court objects only to the business of collection is suggestive of the
private interest motive discussed in Part I of this Note.
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signee to obtain assignments for the procedural convenience of a
group of creditors. Citing Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Long,87 the court
explained:
Take first the right of assignment and of the assignee to bring action in his
own name on the assigned chose. The Carson, Pirie Scott [sic] case fairly il-
lustrates an exercise of these rights. It did not involve in any way a practice
by plaintiff of soliciting claims for litigation or collection, of holding itself out
as able to repossess property, or of contracting for the conduct of litigation.
Plaintiff in that case was one of several creditors of the defendant. The claims
of the others were assigned to plaintiff so all could be sued on in one action.8 8
So long as the assignee is not engaged in the business of obtaining
assignments for collection, the assignments need not be purchased,8 9
a conclusion which differs from that reached by the court in Poirier L
The final method employed under the assignment theory is used
more frequently and turns on the effect of the assignment: a separa-
tion of legal title from equitable title in the claim. Jurisdictions fol-
lowing this approach do not regard consideration for the assignment
as an issue.9 0 The only issue to be determined is whose interests are
actually being asserted in the suit. In State ex rel. State Bar v. Bonded
Collections, Inc.,91 the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that
87. 268 N.W. 518 (Iowa 1936).
88. Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1944).
89. See id. at 582-83.
90. Of the jurisdictions finding against collection agencies, most of them clearly state
that valuable consideration (purchase) for the assignment is not necessary. Some
indicate that partial consideration or contingent consideration in the form of a
promise is sufficient to transfer interest in the debt. See, e.g., J.H. Marshall &
Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 595 (D.C. 1973)(finding that the assign-
ment was valid even though the collection agency purported to have acquired
only a contingent one-third interest in the claim by virtue of its promise to "effect
collection ... and/or to file suit"); State ex rel. State Bar v. Bonded Collections,
Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Wis. 1967)(finding that an assignee is the real party in
interest even if it only receives part of the proceeds and is to account to the as-
signor for the residue, or if the absolute transfer is made conditional upon
recovery).
Others cite the general rule that an assignee may sue in its own name to
recover a debt even though the assignment was made solely for the purpose of
collecting the debt. See, e.g., State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquer-
que, Inc., 514 P.2d 40, 45 (N.M. 1973)(citing the proposition that an assignee is
the real party in interest even though the assignment is only for the purposes of
suit); State ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641, 651 (W. Va. 1981)(finding that
a debtor cannot defend an action brought by an assignee on the ground that the
assignment was made solely for the purpose of collecting a debt). Although these
courts do not directly address the question of consideration, the implication is
that, if there has been any consideration beyond a promise to collect the debt,
such consideration is merely nominal.
Finally, at least one court has held that an assignee may sue in its own name,
regardless of consideration for the assignment. See Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Fi-
nance Sys., Inc., 76 N.W.2d 23 (Mich. 1956).
91. 154 N.W.2d 250 (Wis. 1967).
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[flor procedural purposes[,] an assignee of a claim for collection is, indeed, the
real party in interest, but his interest is a limited one. The assignment con-
fers upon him only a naked legal title, but the beneficial or equitable interest
remains in the assignor. Thus, the beneficial owner of the chose in action is
not the collection agency but the creditor. It is most inappropriate for the
defendants to gain procedural standing to sue by complying with... what is
somewhat inappropriately in this context known as the real-party-in-interest
statute and then assert that because the assignee is the real party in interest
in the procedural sense[,] it stands in all respects in the shoes of the creditor.
This is not the fact.9 2
Rather, the creditor remains the beneficial owner because it retains
the entire interest in the proceeds of the suit, minus the collection
agency's costs and fees. 93 The collection agency asserted that its own-
ership or equity interest in the debt was the amount of its fees and
costs, but the court refused to entertain this argument, calling it
"sheer hypocrisy."94 The court held that, because the collection
agency lacked a true interest in the debt, it was therefore conducting a
suit on behalf of another, a violation of the rules against UPL.95 Since
the assignment purported to authorize this unlawful action, it was
void.96
Whether the collection agency is represented by an attorney adds
little to the analysis under the assignment theory. Collection agencies
acknowledge the general rule that a collection agency cannot repre-
sent itself in court because it is an entity.97 This rule does not by
itself, however, answer the question. Rather, the answer proceeds
naturally under the assignment theory. In those jurisdictions where
the assignment is held sufficient to make the collection agency the real
party in interest, the presence of an attorney is not an issue.9 8 Since
the collection agency is the real party in interest, the attorney will be
representing his or her client's interests in court, the situation which
is normally contemplated in a complex legal system. In contrast,
92. Id. at 255 (citation omitted). For other jurisdictions which follow this reasoning,
see Martinez v. Albuquerque Collection Servs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1495, 1503
(D.N.M. 1994); Kolker v. Duke City Collection Agency, 750 F. Supp. 468, 471-72
(D.N.M. 1990); J.H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 595 (D.C.
1973); Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Fin. Sys., Inc., 76 N.W.2d 23, 25-26, 29 (Mich.
1956); State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, Inc., 514 P.2d 40,
45-46 (N.M. 1973); State ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641, 651-52 (W. Va.
1981).
93. See State ex rel. State Bar v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 255-56
(Wis. 1967).
94. Id. at 256.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634, 641 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted); State ex
rel. State Bar v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Wis. 1967) (quot-
ing In re Otterness, 232 N.W. 318, 319 (Minn. 1930)).




where courts find that the assignment is a mere sham,9 9 they apply
the agency theory discussed next in Part II.B to hold that the presence
of an attorney cannot remove the taint of UPL.100
B. The Agency Theory in UPL Cases
The assignment theory is not the only analytical vehicle courts
have used to decide whether collection agencies are engaged in UPL.
The agency theory is also a popular approach in light of the relation-
ship between the creditor and the collection agency. If the shorthand
description of the assignment theory is "who is the real party in inter-
est," then the shorthand description of the agency theory is "who is the
real party in control." Thus, the central issue to be determined under
this theory is whether the collection agency or the creditor controls the
attorney. The results flow from this finding.
Although the court in Poirier I did not examine the question from
the agency perspective, some courts have used the agency theory ex-
clusively. This approach is often used in cases where the collection
agency has retained an attorney to bring suit,10 1 but the creditor has
not assigned the debts to the collection agency, thereby precluding a
true real-party-in-interest analysis.1 0 2 As the first step in their analy-
sis, courts initially find that the collection agency is the agent of the
creditor.1 0 3 Most courts agree that, where authorized by the creditor,
an agent has the power to select an attorney to represent the credi-
99. See, e.g., State ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641, 651 (W. Va. 1981).
100. See id.
101. To avoid begging the question, no assumptions should be made regarding the
party for whom the attorney is retained.
102. See, e.g., Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 189 S.E. 153, 155 (Va.
1937). Such is not always the case, however. Some courts which employ the
agency theory have simply ignored the fact of assignment. See United Radio, Inc.
v. Cotton, 22 N.E.2d 532, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938) (apparently ignoring the as-
signment altogether). Other courts appear to reject the assignment due to a lack
of valuable consideration although they never actually state their reasoning. See
Divine v. Watauga Hosp., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 628, 630 (M.D.N.C. 1956)(observing
that the contract forms were not under seal and no consideration was cited to
support them).
103. See State ex rel. Porter v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (N.D.
Ala. 1972), affd, 472 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1973); State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S.
Dudley & Co., Inc., 102 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. 1937); Med Controls, Inc. v. Hop-
kins, 573 N.E.2d 154, 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); United Radio v. Cotton, 22
N.E.2d 532, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar
Ass'n, 189 S.E. 153, 156 (Va. 1937); DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 532
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995). See generally In re Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass'n, Inc., 3




tor.10 4 In order to avoid triggering the rules against UPL, however,
the attorney must actually represent the principal and not the agent:
[iut is not necessary that this employment of an attorney should be made by
the client in person, but like other contracts, may be made through a duly
authorized agent, and if the agent acts in accordance with his authority, the
attorney will be the attorney of the client and not of the agent. 1 0 5
Courts determine whom the attorney represents by examining who
controls the attorney's actions and the conduct of the suit. Where the
creditor is in control, the collection agency is regarded merely as an
agent, and no UPL violation has occurred.1 06 Examples of permissible
collection agency activities under this theory include: collection with-
out resort to legal proceedings and without advising the creditor when
to begin proceedings;107 retaining an attorney at the request of the
creditor;1 08 and forwarding accounts to attorneys. 1 09 Where the col-
lection agency controls the actions of the attorney or the course of the
litigation, however, it has acted as an intermediary between the attor-
ney and creditor, destroying the attorney-client relationship and
thereby violating UPL rules.O
The agency analysis is not limited to nonassignment cases. It is
also common in those cases where the collection agency has actually
taken an assignment of the debts and sued on them in its own
name."' In this situation, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
104. See, e.g., State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., Inc., 102 S.W.2d 895, 899
(Mo. 1937). This general rule may be subject to restrictions in some jurisdictions.
For example, the creditor must choose which attorney it wants the agency to re-
tain. See Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 189 S.E. 153, 156 (Va.
1937) (noting that, although the creditor gave the collection agency the express
authority to employ a lawyer, the creditor apparently did not even know the
name of the attorney selected and engaged to represent him).
105. State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., Inc., 102 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo.
1937) (citation omitted).
106. See State ex rel. Porter v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1226, 1229-30
(N.D. Ala. 1972).
107. See State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., Inc., 102 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo.
1937); see also State ex rel. Porter v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1226,
1228-29 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
108. See State ex rel. Porter v. Alabama Ass'n of Credit Executives, 338 So. 2d 812, 815
(Ala. 1976) (citing State ex rel. Porter v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 352 F. Supp. 1226
(N.D. Ala. 1972); State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., Inc., 102 S.W.2d
895, 899 (Mo. 1937); see also Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 189
S.E. 153, 156 (Va. 1937)(implying that the collection agency could retain an attor-
ney with express authorization so long as the creditor specifically selected the
attorney).
109. See State ex rel. Porter v. Alabama Ass'n of Credit Executives, 338 So. 2d 812, 816
(Ala. 1976).
110. See State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., Inc., 102 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Mo.
1937); Med Controls, Inc. v. Hopkins, 573 N.E.2d 154, 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989);
Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 189 S.E. 153, 158 (Va. 1937).




the attorney is controlled by the collection agency and not the creditor.
Indeed, the collection agency's arguments become something of a
catch-22 in this situation. On the one hand, the collection agency
wants to argue that the assignment is valid and operates to make it
the real party in interest.112 To demonstrate this status, the collec-
tion agency will argue that it controls the course of the suit entirely to
show that the creditor's interest in the assigned debt is minimal.113
But after the court finds against the collection agency on the assigne-
ment issue, it uses the argument the collection agency made in that
context to defeat it in the agency context. 114
In determining whether the principal-creditor or the agent-collec-
tion agency is controlling the attorney, the court reminds the collec-
tion agency of its assertion that all decisions regarding the suit lay
entirely within its discretion. At this point, the conclusion that the
agent rather than the principal controls the attorney is foregone. The
consequence of the collection agency's control is that the attorney is
found, in turn, to be its agent."15 Then, because the agent-attorney's
acts cannot exceed the scope of his principal's acts,116 the defect of the
principal is imputed to the agent. The court explains the defect by
reciting the oft-quoted syllogism that "one cannot do through an em-
ployee or agent that which he cannot do himself."117 Since the collec-
tion agency cannot itself represent the creditor in court, the collection
agency's attorney cannot represent the creditor in court. Thus, under
this line of reasoning, a collection agency will be held to engage in
UPL if it sues on assigned debts in its own name even if it is repre-
sented in court by a licensed attorney.
III. ANALYSIS
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the law on this question
varies from state to state, both in terms of result and method, and is
always dependent upon the particular state's common and statutory
law. Therefore, in a jurisdiction where the issue is one of first impres-
sion, a court should not be willing to merely "count cases" to reach a
decision. Rather, the court should engage in a meaningful critical in-
quiry and analyze the transaction and relationships involved from a
functional rather than formal perspective.
112. See State ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641, 651 (W. Va. 1981).
113. See State ex rel. State Bar v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Wis.
1967).
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634, 640 (Utah 1944).
116. See State ex rel. State Bar v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Wis.
1967).
117. J.H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 597 (D.C. 1973); see also
Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634, 640 (Utah 1944).
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A functional analysis of this issue in the context of Nebraska law
reveals that a collection agency which sues on assigned debts in its
own name is not engaged in UPL so long as it is represented by a
licensed attorney. An assignment from the creditor to the collection
agency performs a dual function: first, it vests legal title in the agency
and establishes it as the real party in interest for purposes of the suit;
second, it operates to create a principal-agent relationship between
the creditor and collection agency. Although an attorney-client rela-
tionship does not exist between the creditor and the attorney, the
creditor derives ample protection from the fiduciary duties inherent in
the principal-agent relationship between it and the collection agency.
The presence of a licensed attorney also protects the legal system and
the debtor from incompetence and unethical behavior since the attor-
ney is subject to the court's requirements and restrictions. Thus, by
virtue of the assignment and the presence of an attorney, the applica-
ble rules against UPL are rendered functionally unnecessary.
A. The Marriage of Logic and Function in DeBenedictis v.
Hagenis
The failure of Poirier I and its predecessors, including those courts
which found in favor of collection agencies, is that the courts' analyses
never proceed beyond the formalistic application of labels: a collection
agency is either a real party in interest, or it is not; a collection agency
is either an agent, or it is an intermediary. Certainly, the courts rea-
soned fairly soundly according to the labels, but the decisions re-
mained lacking in substance from a functional perspective. 119 The
courts finding against collection agencies actually came the closest to
examining why they applied particular labels, but the rationales they
gave were little more than recycled truisms which gradually gained
the status of "rules," the most common of which is the litany "one can-
not do through an employee or agent that which he cannot do him-
self,"120 or variations thereon. One court, however, has broken from
the entrenched arguments discussed above 121 to formulate a rule
which is based upon the function of both the assignment theory and
the agency theory.
In 1935, the Supreme Court of Washington held in Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' Rating & Adjusting Co. 122 that collec-
118. 890 P.2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
119. Cf WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 835 ("The courts have often reached conclusions
that a particular activity is unauthorized practice only after the most superficial
examination of the activity, of precedent, and of the rationale for the doctrine.").
120. J.H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 597 (D.C. 1973); see also
Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634, 640 (Utah 1944).
121. See supra Parts lI.A-B.
122. 49 P.2d 26 (Wash. 1935).
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tion agencies could sue in their own names on debts assigned solely for
the purpose of collection and not be engaged in UPL.123 This holding
was subject to the requirement that collection agencies retain attor-
neys to represent them in court.' 24 Sixty years later, the hypothetical
conflict of interest between the creditor and the collection agency
which so concerned other courts' 25 was played out in DeBenedictis v.
Hagen'26 although, significantly, the case did not involve the issue of
UPL.
In Hagen, the owner of a collection agency (DeBenedictis)127
brought an action against its creditor-client (Novak) for breach of con-
tract based upon the assignment of a debt.128 Novak hired
DeBenedictis to collect a substantial debt owed to him by a "long-time
friend" (Hagen), believing that DeBenedictis could motivate Hagen
more effectively than he could.' 29 On the day Novak hired DeBenedic-
tis, he signed a form assignment at DeBenedictis's request.S30
DeBenedictis then began collection efforts which continued for approx-
imately three weeks. When these efforts were unsuccessful,
DeBenedictis informed Novak that he wanted to turn the matter over
to his attorney.'13 DeBenedictis testified that Novak agreed at that
time but later instructed him to stop work because Hagen was going to
pay Novak.132 Novak testified that he objected immediately when
DeBenedictis mentioned giving the account to his attorney and told
him to cease all work.'33 About three weeks later, Novak settled the
debt privately with Hagen.' 34 DeBenedictis argued that, when Novak
assigned him the debt, the assignment effected a complete sale,
123. See id. at 28.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Med Controls, Inc. v. Hopkins, 573 N.E.2d 154, 155 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989).
126. 890 P.2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
127. DeBenedictis was doing business as Interstate Collection Services (ICS).
128. See DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 530 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)(assignment
from Novak to DeBenedictis).
129. See id.
130. The court quoted the relevant portion of the assignment as follows:
For the purpose of collection, I/WE hereby assign, transfer, set over and
sell all my right, title, and interest in this claim with full authority to
sue, compromise, or adjust the same and authorize reassignment....
Recovered monies may be applied first to advanced costs of suit, includ-
ing attorneys fees, and the assignee is accountable for the obligation to
the extent of the principal amount only.
Id. (footnote omitted). The court also noted that the assignment did not indicate
the nature of the relationship or DeBenedictis's compensation. See id.
131. Among other things, the parties disagreed about whether DeBenedictis simply
wanted to turn the account over to the attorney or whether Hagen told him out-





384 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:365
thereby transferring Novak's entire interest to him.135 Because No-
vak had no interest in the debt, he could not legally settle with
Hagen.136
The Hagen court first articulated a distinction which was implied
by the Washington Supreme Court in 1935. In that case, the court
had held that "there [is no] need for a specified consideration for the
assignments. 'An assignment for the purpose of collection is an as-
signment for a valuable consideration.'"1 3 7 The court in Hagen inter-
preted this statement to mean that other kinds of assignments exist:
[We distinguish between two kinds of assignments. On the one hand, a credi-
tor/assignor can assign his or her claim against a debtor in such a way as to
effect a complete sale of the claim. An example is the business that sells a
group of accounts receivable; frequently, it will convey its entire ownership
interest in exchange for a cash payment.
On the other hand, a creditor/assignor can assign his or her claim against a
debtor for purposes of collection. Such an assignment transfers legal title to
the claim so the assignee can sue in his or her own name .... This leaves
equitable ownership with the creditor/assignor. 13 8
Here, the court clearly employed the traditional assignment theory.139
It agreed with the trial court that the assignment did not effect a sale
but was intended solely for the purpose of collection, observing in par-
ticular that the only consideration from DeBenedictis was the promise
to attempt to collect the debt.140 The form of the consideration was
not a fatal flaw, though only in light of the holding in Merchants' Rat-
ing that a specified consideration was not necessary in an assignment
for collection.14 1
At this point, however, the court seemed to recognize the weakness
in the traditional reasoning. If it held that Novak could unilaterally
rescind the assignment because he still retained equitable ownership
of the debt, such a holding would cut against Washington's rule that,
as the holder of the legal title, DeBenedictis was the real party in in-
terest and was entitled to sue in his own name and control the course
of the litigation.142 To avoid this result, the court would be forced to
hold that Novak was liable for breach of contract. But holding Novak
liable for breach of contract would elevate form above substance, pro-
135. See id. at 531-32.
136. See id. at 532.
137. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' Rating & Adjusting Co., 49 P.2d 26,28
(Wash. 1935) (citing McDaniel v. Pressler, 29 P. 209, 210 (Wash. 1892)).
138. DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (citations
omitted).
139. See supra Part HA.
140. See DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
141. See Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' Rating & Adjusting Co., 49 P.2d
26, 28 (Wash. 1935).
142. See id; accord Cohn v. Thompson, 16 P.2d 364, 366 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1932), followed by LeDoux v. Credit Research Corp., 125 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975).
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tecting the holder of the legal title and harming the holder of the equi-
table title, which would seem to be a ludicrous consequence.
The court, though, had done its homework. Given the prevalence
with which other courts had applied the agency theory, it is not sur-
prising that the Hagen court employed agency principles in its next
analytical step. Yet it did not merely resort to labeling; it articulated
the rationale behind the labels. The court found that "the relationship
[between assignor and an assignee for collection] generally is one of
principal-agent,"'143 and that the split in ownership which resulted
from the assignment created a fiduciary relationship between the as-
signor and assignee. 144 This finding of a fiduciary relationship is the
functional step which nearly every court addressing UPL issues has
failed to take, but it would seem to be a rather elementary one. That a
fiduciary relationship exists between a principal and an agent is a
generally-accepted legal principle: "An agent is a fiduciary with re-
spect to matters within the scope of his agency.'145 In addition, an
143. DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)(footnote
omitted).
144. See id. Other jurisdictions also recognize that fiduciary duties arise from an as-
signment for collection. See, e.g., Cross v. Bonded Adjustment Bureau, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 801, 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)(finding that a fiduciary relationship exists
between an assignee and assignor); Elam v. Arzaga, 10 P.2d 805, 807 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1932)(finding that a fiduciary relationship existed between the creditor and
the collection agency).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958); accord REuscHLEIN & GREGORY,
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 67, at 125-26 (2d ed. 1990) ("[Aln agent
is under [a] duty to act solely and entirely for the benefit of his principal in every
matter connected with his agency.")(footnote omitted).
In a case where a collection agency has taken assignments from more than
one creditor, it necessarily will have fiduciary duties to all of them. Obviously,
this fact could raise conflicts of interest concerns which have previously charac-
terized courts' objections to an attorney's apparent representation of both the
creditor and the collection agency.
A possible answer to this concern is that the collection agency, as part of its
fiduciary duty to each creditor, has the duty to disclose the fact of its relationship
with other creditors although it must take care not to provide information regard-
ing a debtor's particular obligations; this would trigger FDCPA liability. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (1994). Perhaps the appropriate time for this disclosure is
when the creditor and the collection agency enter into their relational agreement
(as opposed to the individual assignments). In addition, if the creditor believes
that the collection agency is not acting in its best interests, it is always free to
revoke the agency's authority at any time. See DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d
529,533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 (1958).
Finally, it should be asked, is this concern one which arises for the creditor, or
does it arise for the collection agency who may have more fiduciary duties than it
can handle? Concern for the creditor seems a bit misplaced since its interests are
already amply protected by the fiduciary duty itself. If, on the other hand, it is
concern for the collection agency which may have "over-extended" itself duty-
wise, the simple answer is that the collection agency chose to enter into these
relationships and is chargeable with the knowledge of the duties they entail.
That the agency made an unwise choice is no reason to relieve it of its obligations.
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assignee is an agent "[if the assignee is to account for the proceeds [of
an assignment] to the assignor,"14 6 and a collection agency is specifi-
cally an independent contractor-agent of the creditor.' 47 As a result of
this holding, DeBenedictis would be answerable to Novak without the
court's having to modify the rule regarding an assignee's status as real
party in interest.
Indeed, the court's decision evidences a rational balancing of the
interests involved. First, it held that, as principal, Novak had the
power to revoke DeBenedictis's authority on the assigned debtl48 and
found that he had in fact revoked DeBenedictis' authority before set-
tling with Hagen.149 The court further observed that it did not matter
whether the revocation was wrongfulsO because, as principal, Novak
had the power to revoke his agent's authority at any time.15' But
DeBenedictis was not left without remedy; there was, after all, a con-
tract between the parties, and Novak's revocation of DeBenedictis' au-
thority constituted a breach of that contract.15 2 Novak was not liable
for the amount of DeBenedictis' contingent fee as if had he collected
the debt; rather, Novak was liable only for the value of DeBenedictis'
services up until the time of the breach.' 5 3 This result is consistent
with the court's use of the assignment theory in that it protects the
assignee's status as the real party in interest and allows him to re-
cover the value of his services in the event of a breach by the assignor.
It is also consistent with the court's use of the agency theory in that it
protects the principal-assignor from losing complete control over prop-
erty in which he has a beneficial interest. Had the court not examined
the function of the assignment and agency rules, it could not have bal-
anced the parties' interests, and injustice would have resulted.
B. Trustees and Assignees for Collection: Unlikely
Bedfellows?
That the court's approach in Hagen was logical is further demon-
strated by analogizing the duties of an assignee for collection to those
of a trustee. As with an assignment for collection, legal title is sepa-
rated from equitable title in a trust; the trustee holds the legal title
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14G cmt. a (1958).
147. See id. at § 14N cmt. a.
148. See DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 533 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 (1958).
149. See DeBenedictis v. Hagen, 890 P.2d 529, 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 533; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY § 118 cmt. b
(1958)('The principal has [the] power to revoke and the agent has power to re-
nounce, although doing so is in violation of a contract between the parties. . .




while the beneficiary retains the equitable title.154 In addition, the
trustee as legal title holder is regarded as the real party in interest
and may sue in his or her own name on behalf of the trust, 5 5 just like
the assignee of a claim. Finally, the beneficiary of a trust generally
may not maintain a suit in equity against a third party,1S6 a rule
which is apparently followed by a majority of jurisdictions. 157
The rule prohibiting equity suits by the beneficiary of a trust also
holds true for a creditor after he assigns the debt. Usually, the credi-
tor may not maintain a suit in equity against a debtor once the debt is
assigned.' 5 8 Of course, the other distinctive feature of a trust is the
fiduciary duty which exists between the trustee and the beneficiary:
"[A] trustee owes beneficiaries of a trust his undivided loyalty and
good faith, and all his acts as such trustee must be in the interest of
the cestui que trust and no one else."159
Given the obvious and striking similarity between trustees and
beneficiaries, agents and principals, and assignees and assignors for
collection, it is not surprising that courts have applied the principles
underlying these relationships in actions arising between the creditor
and the collection agency, as discussed above.' 60 What is most inter-
esting, however, is that few, if any, courts have ever applied these
principles in cases where the collection agency has been accused of
violating the rules against UPL,161 a situation in which these princi-
ples make perfect sense. Perhaps the courts simply have not been in-
terested in making the analogy. After all, a good number of the UPL
154. See Apollinari v. Johnson, 305 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); see also
Karpfv. Karpf, 240 Neb. 302, 310,481 N.W.2d 891,896 (1992); Anderson v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
155. See Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); accord Larson v. Sylvester, 185 N.E. 44,46 (Mass. 1933)(A trustee does not
act "as representative or agent of another. He [acts] for himself, but with fiduci-
ary obligations to others.").
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 282(1) (1976).
157. See Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
158. See Cohn v. Thompson, 16 P.2d 364, 366 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1932)('The
services performed by the attorney were for the assignee alone, who was the real
party in interest and exercised entire control of the action; the assignor having no
power to exercise any control whatsoever either over the action or the attorney in
the performance of his services.")(emphasis added), quoted with approval in Le-
Doux v. Credit Research Corp., 125 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168 (Cal. App. 1975).
159. Karpfv. Karpf, 240 Neb. 302, 311, 481 N.W.2d 891, 897 (1992) (quoting State ex
rel. Ebke v. Board of Educ. Lands & Funds, 154 Neb. 244, 249, 47 N.W.2d 520,
523 (1951)); accord Larson v. Sylvester, 185 N.E. 44, 46 (Mass. 1933).
160. See supra Part ]ILA and notes therein.
161. An extensive search unearthed only one case in which both a collector's fiduciary
duty and the unauthorized practice of law were even mentioned. See Ulberg v.
Seattle Bonded, Inc., 626 P.2d 522, 524 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)(holding on other
grounds and not reaching the questions of fiduciary duty or whether the collec-
tion agency was engaged in UPL).
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cases arose at a time when collection agencies were beginning to com-
pete significantly with attorneys for the collection business 16 2 and
when prosecutions for UPL were at their peak.' 6 3 If courts had ap-
plied the analogy in UPL cases, they would have been forced to ac-
knowledge the existence of a fiduciary duty between the creditor and
the collection agency. The existence of this duty would then have un-
dercut their primary argument against collection agencies: without
the protection of an attorney-client relationship,16 4 the creditor is left
vulnerable to self-interested actions by the collection agency. The fi-
duciary duty arising under the assignment and agency theories, how-
ever, would play the same role as the fiduciary duty between an
attorney and his or her client. Whether or not the courts have been
improperly influenced, the failure to apply these principles should
highlight the problem with courts asserting exclusive jurisdiction over
the UPL issue,165 given "the natural tendency of all professions to act
in their own self interest."16 6
C. Form Following Function: Collection Agencies and UPL
in Nebraska
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to answer
the question of whether collection agencies which sue in their own
names on assigned debts are engaged in UPL. When the question is
presented, the court will have a relevant body of Nebraska law upon
which it can draw, both statutory and common law. When the court
examines Nebraska law, it will find precedents which readily lend
themselves to the kind of functional analysis discussed above.16 7
The Nebraska legislature has enacted statutes addressing proce-
dure rules for parties: the real party in interest statute, § 25-301;L68
162. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 182-83, 187-88 (observing that it was about this
time that courts began offering the public interest as the motivation for attempt-
ing to prevent UPL, rather than attorneys' private interests); see also WoLFRAM,
supra note 11, at 825-26.
163. See Christensen, supra note 1, at 189-97.
164. Remember, these courts made the initial finding either that the attorney em-
ployed by the collection agency represented the collection agency and not the
creditor, or that the attorney's loyalties had been impermissibly divided, giving
rise to a potential conflict of interest.
165. See discussion infra Part 11.C.
166. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 835 (quoting Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d
1186, 1189 (Fla. 1978).
167. See discussion supra Parts m.A-B.
168. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-301 (1995). The statute provides: "Every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided
in section 25-304." Id.
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the statute for assignees, § 25-302;169 and the parties to actions stat-
ute, § 25-304.17o The Nebraska court has had the opportunity to con-
strue these statutes on a number of occasions. The issues in Archer v.
Musickl7l (Archer 1) are fairly analogous to the issues which are the
subject of this Note. In Archer I, Archer sued his former employer,
Musick, for unpaid overtime compensation, 172 pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.173 Archer brought forty claims against
Musick, one of which was his own, and thirty-nine of which had been
assigned to him by Musick's other employees.1 7 4 Musick demurred on
the grounds that Archer's petition had misjoined causes of action.175
The court interpreted § 25-302 (the assignee statute) as permitting a
party to bring an action in his own name "when he has in fact become
the owner of a thing in action by assignment. 1 76 The type of assign-
ment the court appeared to have in mind was an assignment by sale,
as in Poirier L177 The court found that, although Archer was an as-
signee, he was an assignee for collection and not a real party in inter-
est since he was not the beneficial owner of the property assigned.178
Thus, under the exception for assignees for collection in § 25-304,
Archer had the authority to sue on the assignments in his own
name.1 79 However, because he was not the real party in interest in
the other thirty-nine claims, judgment on those claims would not af-
fect him or any of the other real parties in interest as required under
169. Id. at § 25-302. The statute provides: "The assignee of a thing in action may
maintain an action thereon in his own name and behalf, without the name of the
assignor." Id.
170. Id. at § 25-304. The statute provides:
An executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a per-
son with whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of
another, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may bring an ac-
tion without joining with him the person for whose benefit it is prose-
cuted. Officers may sue and be sued in such name as is authorized by
law, and official bonds may be sued upon in the same way, and assignees
of choses in action assigned for the purpose of collection, may sue on any
claim assigned in writing, but such assignee shall be required to furnish
security for costs as in case of nonresident plaintiffs.
Id. (emphasis added).
171. 147 Neb. 344, 23 N.W.2d 323 (1946), vacated, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908
(1947).
172. See id. at 347, 23 N.W.2d at 325.
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
174. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 347, 23 N.W.2d 323, 325-26 (1946).
175. See id. at 346, 23 N.W.2d at 325.
176. Id. at 350-51, 23 N.W.2d at 327.
177. See Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirier, 680 So. 2d 735, 739 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
178. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 353, 23 N.W.2d 323, 328 (1946)(citing Hoag-




§ 25-702 (joinder of causes), 8 0 so the court dismissed the assigned
claims as improperly joined.181 Three justices dissented in the
opinion.' 8 2
In Archer 11, 183 after hearing arguments on a motion for rehearing,
the court vacated its opinion in Archer .184 The court repeated its
findings that Archer was expressly authorized by statute to maintain
an action in his own name as an assignee for collection of the other
thirty-nine claims.' 8 5 It also noted that the case1 86 upon which
Archer I had relied for its finding that an assignee for collection is not
a real party in interest, was decided before the legislature amended
§ 25-304187 to include assignees for collection, thereby suggesting that
the legislature had intended to change that particular rule.'8 8 The
court reasoned that the proper way to determine whether Archer was
the real party in interest was to examine the function of that
requirement.
In ascertaining whether the plaintiff is the real party in interest, the primary
and fundamental test to be applied is whether the prosecution of the action
will save the defendant from further harassment or vexation at the hands of
other claimants to the same demand. If the defendant is not cut offfrom any
just defense, offset, or counterclaim against the demand and a judgment in
behalf of the party suing will fully protect him when discharged, then is his
concern at an end.1
8 9
That is, if a judgment in an action brought by an assignee for collec-
tion will prevent the assignor from suing the defendant later on,' 9 0
then the assignee is the real party in interest. Indeed, the court ob-
served, an earlier case had held that, for the purpose of protecting a
180. NE . REv. STAT. § 25-702 (1995). The statute provides: 'The causes of action so
united must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of
trial." Id.
181. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 353, 23 N.W.2d 323, 328 (1946).
182. See id. at 365, 23 N.W.2d at 335.
183. 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
184. See id. at 1019, 25 N.W.2d at 909.
185. See id. at 1024, 25 N.W.2d at 911; accord State Sec. Co. v. Federated Mut. Imple-
ment & Hardware Ins. Co., 204 F. Supp. 207, 217 (D. Neb. 1960), affd, 308 F.2d
452 (8th Cir. 1962); Vowers & Sons, Inc. v. Strasheim, 248 Neb. 699, 704, 538
N.W.2d 756, 759-60 (1995); Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 67,
22 N.W.2d 403, 413 (1946).
186. See Hoagland v. Van Etten, 22 Neb. 681, 35 N.W. 869 (1888).
187. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-304 (1995)(identifying exceptions to the real party in inter-
est statute).
188. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 1026, 25 N.W.2d 908, 912 (1947).
189. Id., 25 N.W.2d at 913 (quoting State ex rel. Sorensen v. Nemaha County Bank,
124 Neb. 883, 888-89, 248 N.W. 650, 653 (1933)(other citations omitted); accord
Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 361, 23 N.W.2d 323, 332 (1946)(Chappell, J.,
dissenting)("It is enough for defendant to know that plaintiff is the party in legal
interest and that a recovery by him will be full protection against a subsequent
suit by another.").
190. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982).
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defendant from multiple suits, the other parties identified in § 25-304
were also real parties in interest.191 Based on this reasoning, the
court held that, under Nebraska law, an assignee for collection is the
real party in interest in a suit brought on the assignment.' 92
The court also examined the precise nature of the assignee's inter-
est. It recognized that the assignee took legal title of the assigned
claim while the assignor was entitled to the proceeds as the holder of
the equitable title.'9 3 Most notably, the dissenting opinion in Archer
i, which was written by the author of the majority opinion in Archer
II, also observed the existence of the fiduciary relationship between
the assignee and assignor, similar to that of a trustee or agent,' 9 4
although that observation was not repeated in Archer II. Clearly, the
kind of analysis used by the court in DeBenedictis v. Hagen' 95 is not
without precedent in Nebraska.
The Nebraska legislature has also promulgated regulations for col-
lection agencies doing business in this state. The Collection Agency
Act' 96 (Act) defines a collection agency as
[all persons, firms, corporations, and associations directly or indirectly en-
gaged in soliciting, from more than one person, firm, corporation, or associa-
tion, claims of any kind owed or due or asserted to be owed or due such
solicited person, firm, corporation, or association, and all persons, firms, cor-
porations, and associations directly or indirectly engaged in asserting, enforc-
ing, or prosecuting such claims .... 197
The language of the statute clearly contemplates that the collection
agency will use more than just dunning procedures 9S to effect collec-
tion; the final clause indicates that those persons or entities which ap-
pear in court to assert, enforce, or prosecute their claims will be
regulated as collection agencies. Perhaps more significant is the de-
scription of those persons and entities which are excluded from the
definition: "Collection agency shall not mean or include.., a person,
firm, corporation, or association which, for valuable consideration,
purchases accounts, claims, or demands of another and then, in such
purchaser's own name, proceeds to assert or collect such accounts,
claims, or demands."'99
191. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 1027, 25 N.W.2d 908, 913 (1947)(citing
Meeker v. Waldron, 62 Neb. 689, 87 N.W. 539 (1901)).
192. See id.
193. See id; see also Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 361, 23 N.W.2d 323, 332 (1946).
194. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 361, 23 N.W.2d 323, 333 (1946)(Chappell, J.,
dissenting)(citation omitted).
195. 890 P.2d 529, 532-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
196. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 45-601 to -623 (1993).
197. Id. at § 45-602(2)(a) (emphasis added).
198. For example, "negotiating, adjusting and settling claims without threat of litiga-
tion, or seeking payment by written letter or oral request...." J.H. Marshall &
Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 593-94 (D.C. 1973).
199. NEB. Ray. STAT. § 45-602(3)(k) (1993).
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Although the Act does not purport to prescribe how collection agen-
cies should function, the legislature's understanding of how their busi-
ness will be conducted is plain. If a person or an entity purchases a
debt for valuable consideration, 2 0 0 that person or entity does not come
under the ambit of the Act and will not be regulated by state law.
Under Nebraska law, the only other means available to assert, en-
force, or prosecute the claim of another is through assignment, as dis-
cussed in Archer 11.201 Thus, only where collection agencies operate
by means of assignment will such agencies be regulated by state law.
The regulations themselves are designed to protect collection agen-
cies' clients and to make collection agencies accountable to a state
board2o2 with fairly broad oversight powers. The regulations require:
licensure;2O3 a demonstration that the proprietor is trustworthy, hon-
est, financially responsible, competent, and experienced in the collec-
tion business or other acceptable area of business; 2 04 the furnishing of
a corporate surety bond in an amount ranging from five thousand to
fifteen thousand dollars;205 an accounting to each of its clients for the
collections it obtains on a monthly basis;206 license renewal each
year;20 7 and the submission of a verified financial statement if so re-
quired.208 The Act also prohibits the issuance of a license to anyone
convicted of fraud or the failure to account to a cient;209 provides for
the revocation of a license for a conviction of fraud, embezzlement, or
the failure to account;2 10 authorizes the Collection Agency Board to
hold a hearing for revocation on its own motion or on the sworn com-
plaint of any client;2 11 and gives the Board subpoena power.21 2 Fi-
nally, the Act provides that "[n]othing in the Collection Agency Act
shall be construed to authorize or permit the holder of a license or the
200. Cf Bump v. Barnett, 16 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Iowa 1944) (holding collection agency
is engaged in UPL unless claims were purchased); Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poi-
rier, 680 So. 2d 735, 741, 745 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that, for assignment of
claim to be valid under Collection Agency Regulation Act, claim must be
purchased).
201. 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
202. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-605 (1993)(the "Collection Agency Licensing Board").
203. See id. § 45-606.
204. See id. § 45-607(1).
205. See id. § 45-608.
206. See id. This section also provides a specific remedy to any creditor who has not
received the required accounting, or who "has been damaged by failure of the
licensee to comply with all agreements entered into with such person...." Id
This remedy would most likely be in addition to any remedy at common law
which the creditor would have for breach of fiduciary duty.
207. See id, § 45-611.
208. See id. § 45-619.
209. See id. § 45-607(2).
210. See id. § 45-612.
211. See id. § 45-613.
212. See id. § 45-614.
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holder of a solicitor's certificate, as provided for in the act, to engage in
the practice of law."2 13 Under current Nebraska law, however, this
provision 2 14 merely begs the question.
Nebraska also has a statute that generally prohibits UPL. Section
7-101 provides that anyone who is not an attorney may not
practice as an attorney..., or commence, conduct or defend any action or
proceeding to which he is not a party, either by using... his own name,... or
by drawing pleadings or other papers to be signed and filed by a party, in any
court of record of this state, unless he has been previously admitted to the bar
by order of the Supreme Court of this state.... It is hereby made the duty of
the judges of such courts to enforce this prohibition.2 1 5
Thus, the practice of law clearly includes court representation, as well
as the preparation and filing of necessary papers.2 16 In contrast, pro
se representation is not prohibited as the unauthorized practice of law
because the pro se litigant is himself a party to the action.2 17 The
UPL statute2l 8 does not, however, address whether or not a collection
agency may sue in its own name without engaging in UPL.
Beyond the failure of section 7-101 to address the collection
agency's status in the UPL debate, the UPL statute exhibits an even
greater shortcoming in that it presents a perfect opportunity for mis-
application. The potential problem lies in the word "party." Section 7-
101 (the UPL statute) and section 25-301 (the real party in interest
statute) both use the word "party"; the problem is that they each use
the word for a different purpose. Section 7-101 uses the word "party"
to specify who may "commence, conduct, or defend (an) action" without
an attorney. In other words, it proscribes pro se litigation. In con-
trast, section 25-301 uses the word "party" in a more general sense, to
require that persons or entities named as parties have actual interests
at stake in the suit. The UPL statute2 19 and the real party in interest
statute2 20 plainly have different functions, and a court applying these
provisions must observe the purpose for which the word "party " is
used in each.
Thus, X Corporation may sue Y Corporation in its own name for
breach of contract where X Corporation is a party to or otherwise has
an interest in the contract. However, X Corporation may not repre-
sent itself in court pro se because it is an entity. Although X Corpora-
tion is not allowed to be a "party" for the purpose of pro se litigation, it
213. Id. § 45-622.
214. See id.
215. NEB. REv. STAT. § 7-101 (1991).
216. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 147 Neb. 527, 532-33, 23 N.W.2d 720, 722-23
(1946).
217. See Waite v. Carpenter, 1 Neb. App. 321, 325, 496 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (1992).
218. NE . REv. STAT. § 7-101 (1991).
219. Id.
220. NE . Rav. STAT. § 25-301 (1995).
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is nonetheless a "party" for purposes of satisfying the real party in
interest requirement.
Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court has already recognized a
similar distinction. In Back Acres Pure Trust v. Fahnlander,221 the
court held that, although a trustee may properly sue in his own name
on behalf of the trust, the trustee must be represented by an attorney
in court "because in this capacity such trustee would be representing
interests of others and would therefore be engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of law."222
This distinction would also hold true in the collection agency con-
text. As the court in Archer v. Musack2 23 has already held, when a
collection agency brings suit on an assigned debt, it is the real party in
interest and may, therefore, sue in its own name. For the purpose of
pro se representation, however, a collection agency may not represent
itself in court as a party for two reasons: first, it is an entity and is
simply not allowed to appear pro se;2 2 4 second, like a trustee, the col-
lection agency does not hold the equitable interest and should be re-
quired to protect what is ultimately the creditor's property by hiring
an attorney. When the real party in interest brings a suit through its
attorney, however, the proper party is in court, represented by counsel
and there simply is no UPL problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question, then, yet remains: Is a collection agency in Ne-
braska, which sues on assigned debts in its own name, engaged in
UPL? The conclusion of this Note is that, so long as the collection
agency is represented by a licensed attorney, UPL need not be a con-
cern. When the Nebraska Supreme Court decides this question, it
should first examine its common law precedents. Nebraska case law
clearly tracks the principles of the assignment theory discussed in
Part II.A. The dissent in Archer I also alludes to the similarity be-
221. 233 Neb. 28, 443 N.W.2d 604 (1989).
222. Id. at 29, 443 N.W.2d at 605 (emphasis added). This is a logical result. By re-
quiring the trustee to be represented by a licensed attorney, (the attorney's client
in this situation is the trustee), the court aids the trustee in upholding his or her
fiduciary duties to the beneficiary. If a trustee were allowed to appear pro se, the
possibility that the trustee could endanger the trust through his or her incompe-
tence is a very real one; the trustee could then be held liable for breach of fiduci-
ary duty. See Karpf v. Karpf, 240 Neb. 302, 309, 481 N.W.2d 891, 896 (1992)
("The trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that
would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another
... .")(alteration in original) (quoting In re Conservatorship of Martin, 228 Neb.
103, 104, 421 N.W.2d 463, 464 (1988)).
223. 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947).
224. See Niklaus v. Abel Constr. Co., 164 Neb. 842, 849, 83 N.W.2d 904, 910 (1957).
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tween collection issues, agency principles and trustees. 2 25 Recent
cases also demonstrate that, while trustees and functionally similar
persons or entities cannot represent themselves in court, they remain
the real parties in interest and are not engaged in UPL when they
bring suit.2 26
The Nebraska statutes also support the conclusion that no UPL
violation has occurred as long as the collection agency is represented
by an attorney. Although the Nebraska Supreme Court claims for it-
self "the power to define and regulate the practice of law as an inher-
ent power of the judiciary, 2 27 the Collection Agency Act 22s does not
purport to authorize any act which the court has deemed to be UPL.
It does not authorize collection agencies to give legal advice, 22 9 to pre-
pare legal documents, 2 30 or to appear in court pro se.2 31 Instead, the
Act's definition of "collection agency"2 32 implicity recognizes the effect
of the real-party-in-interest statute,233 the statute for assignees, 23 4
and the statute defining parties to actions,2 35 as well as the case law
225. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 361, 23 N.W.2d 323, 333 (1946)(Chaptell, J.,
dissenting). One point of interest is the timing of the Archer cases and State ex
rel. Johnson v. Childe, (Childe II), 147 Neb. 527, 23 N.W.2d 720 (1946), a case
dealing with layman representation which, along with its companion case, 139
Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941), is often cited in UPL cases which have arisen dur-
ing the past fifty years. Archer I was decided on June 7, 1946. Childe I was
decided on July 12, 1946. Archer II, which vacated Archer I, was decided on Jan.
31, 1947. That is, when the court had before it the question of the ability of an
assignee for collection to maintain an action as the real party in interest, it would
have just decided a case in which a layman purporting to represent the interests
of others was held to be engaged in UPL. That the court made no mention of the
analogous issues involved in these cases is a rather telling omission.
226. See Back Acres Pure Trust v. Fallander, 233 Neb. 28, 29, 443 N.W.2d 604, 605
(1989); accord Waite v. Carpenter, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 321, 325-26, 496 N.W.2d 1, 4
(1992)(indicating that, although a personal representative cannot represent him-
self pro se, he is still the proper person to bring the suit).
227. State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 92, 295 N.W. 381, 382 (1941).
228. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 45-601 to -623 (1993).
229. See State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 295-96, 268 N.W. 95, 96 (1936).
230. See id.; see also NEB. RaV. STAT. § 7-101 (1991).
231. See Back Acres Pure Trust v. Fahnlander, 233 Neb. 28, 29, 443 N.W.2d 604, 605
(1989); Niklaus v. Abel Constr. Co., 164 Neb. 842, 849, 83 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1957)
(reciting the rule that a corporation cannot appear pro se); Waite v. Carpenter, 1
Neb. Ct. App. 321, 327-28,496 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1992). Indeed, the act can be read as
prohibiting collection agencies from appearing pro se under Nebraska Revised
Statute section 45-622 if the court followed the reasoning in these cases.
232. See NEB. Rav. STAT. § 45-602 (2)(a), (3)(k) (1993).
233. NEB. Ray. STAT. § 25-301 (1995).
234. Id. § 25-302.
235. Id. § 25-304.
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construing these statutes. 236 It does not infringe upon the judicial
function but merely follows the law established by the court itself.
At this point, all that is left for the court to do is to examine the
function of the rules against UPL by asking the perennial question:
"Why do we care?" If we care because we are concerned that collection
agencies will file frivolous lawsuits which harass debtors and waste
court time and resources, the answer is that the court has recourse to
the attorney who filed the suit. Because an attorney is an officer of the
court, the court may punish him for his misconduct.237 Moreover, the
FDCPA provides the debtor with additional safeguards by strictly reg-
ulating the conduct of collection agencies. If we care because we are
concerned that the creditor lacks the protection of the attorney-client
relationship, the answer is that the creditor is amply protected by the
fiduciary duties that arise out of the principal-agent relationship cre-
ated by the assignment. The creditor is further protected by the appli-
cable provisions of the Nebraska Collection Agency Act.238 If we care
because other jurisdictions have historically ruled a particular way,
the easy answer is that, in many cases, their laws are different. The
more honest answer is that Nebraska should not join a tradition that
has failed to examine the functions of and reasons for its rules. When
examined critically and in the context of Nebraska law, the conclusion
is plain: a collection agency which is represented by a licensed attor-
ney and sues in its own name on assigned debts is not engaged in
UPL.
Kathryn D. Folts '99
236. See Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 344, 359-64, 23 N.W.2d 323, 331-35 (1946)(Chap-
pell, J., dissenting); Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 1023-28, 25 N.W.2d 908,
911-13 (1947).
237. See In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 287-88, 275
N.W. 265, 267-68 (1937).
238. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 45-601 to -623 (1993).
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